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Inattentional blindness (IB) refers to the finding that people do not always see what 
appears in their gaze.  Though IB affects large percentages of people, it is unclear why there 
are individual differences in susceptibility.  The present study addressed whether individual 
differences in attentional control modulate susceptibility to IB.  Using an operation span task, 
participants were sorted into low, medium, or high levels of attentional control.  Participants 
watched a classic IB video and were instructed to count passes among basketball players, 
wherein 42% failed to notice the unexpected: a person wearing a gorilla suit.  When 
participants were on-task with their pass counts, susceptibility to IB decreased dramatically 
across the low, medium, and high groups (64%, 48%, and 35%, respectively).  These results 
suggest that variability in attentional control is a potential mechanism underlying the 
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It has been demonstrated that people do not always see what appears in their line of 
sight.  This observation has been termed inattentional blindness (hereafter, IB; see Mack & 
Rock, 1998; Neisser & Becklen, 1975; Simons & Chabris, 1999).  A typical laboratory task 
assessing IB requires an individual to perform an attention-demanding task (primary task) 
during which an unexpected stimulus is presented (e.g., a moving bar, a black diamond, or a 
gorilla) at one critical trial or time point.  The individual will then be asked if they noticed 
anything unusual or unexpected during their performance of the primary task.   Individuals 
that indicate not seeing anything unusual are said to be exhibiting IB.  For example, in a 
classic experiment, Simons and Chabris (1999) asked participants to watch a video where 
several actors were playing basketball, and unbeknownst to the participants, another actor in 
a gorilla suit proceeded to walk across the frame, pause for a moment, beat its chest, and then 
exit the frame.  As the primary task for subjects was to count passes among the actors who 
were playing the basketball game, the gorilla frequently went unnoticed by participants, 
typically about 44% of the time.  Though large percentages of people have clearly been 
shown to demonstrate IB, for the purpose of the present study, it is unclear why some 









Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Inattentional Blindness 
 
Recently, Simons and Jensen (2009) assessed whether individual differences in 
ability on the primary task would predict susceptibility to IB.  In their study, the participants’ 
primary task was to track multiple objects that were moving at variable speeds.  Group status 
was determined by the speed at which a participant was able to accurately track the objects.   
Simons and Jensen found that group status on the primary task had no influence on 
susceptibility to IB.  However, despite this null result, other studies in the literature have 
reported susceptibility to IB that varies across groups.  For example, in a basketball/gorilla 
variant of the IB experiment described above, when actual basketball players were used as 
participants, they were more likely to notice the unexpected event, quite likely due to their 
increased expertise or automaticity of the primary task of tracking passes (see Memmert, 
2006).   Furthermore, Clifasefi et al. (2006) found that intoxicated individuals were more 
susceptible to IB than their sober counterparts.  Finally, it has been argued that individuals 
with autism may be less susceptible to IB (Grandin & Johnson, 2005).  Taken together, these 
findings suggest that there are individual differences in mental state or cognitive abilities that 
may underlie differential susceptibility to IB.   
An important question remains:  Is there a unifying cognitive mechanism that could 
be used to explain the apparent modulation of IB across individuals?  We speculate that 
individual differences in susceptibility to IB ought to be related somehow to the cognitive 
construct of attention.  For example, it may be the case that intoxicated individuals in the 
Clifasefi et al. (2006) study were more susceptible to IB due to alcohol’s deleterious 
influence on brain activity in executive attention regions that are housed in frontal cortex 
(Dao-Castellana et al., 1998).  Therefore, we hypothesize that the differential susceptibility 
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that has been observed in the IB literature is due to individual differences in attentional 
capacity.  Consistent with this assertion, older adults are generally more susceptible to IB 
than young adults (see Rizzo et al., 2009, on aging/change blindness), which may be due, at 
least in part, to age-related breakdowns in attentional capacity or the control over the 
contents of their limited capacity attentional resources (see Balota, Dolan, & Duchek, 2000; 
Watson, Lambert, Miller, & Strayer, in press). 
 
Individual Differences in Working Memory Capacity  
And Controlled Attention 
Relevant to the present theoretical discussion on attention is the argument that one of 
the primary functions of working memory is attentional control (Kane & Engle, 2002). 
Specifically, working memory or executive attention is used to maintain task goals in an 
active state in the presence of interfering information.  From an attentional-control 
perspective, one might expect individual differences in working memory capacity (hereafter, 
WMC) to influence performance in cognitively challenging tasks that require the active 
maintenance of task goals in the face of potentially interfering information (Engle, 2002). 
Consistent with this reasoning, individuals with lower WMC perform more poorly than 
individuals with higher WMC in situations where successful performance is dependent on 
minimizing interference, including but not limited to dichotic listening, the antisaccade task, 
Stroop color naming, and associative false memory paradigms (see Conway, Cowan, & 
Bunting, 2001; Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Kane & Engle, 2003; Watson, 
Bunting, Poole, & Conway, 2005, respectively).  For example, using the Stroop task where 
the participants’ goal is to name ink colors and to ignore distracting words, Kane and Engle 
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(2003) found that individuals with lower WMC produced more naming errors than those with 
higher WMC in the incongruent condition, and thus were more likely to be off-task and to 
mistakenly say “red” to the stimulus RED printed in green ink. 
Earlier we speculated on the role of attentional capacity in modulating susceptibility 
to IB.   More specifically, it may be that individual differences in WMC will predict 
differential susceptibility to IB.  There are some important methodological and theoretical 
similarities between research on WMC and research on IB that guide this prediction.  For 
instance, consider that in both the IB and WMC literatures, participants are often asked to 
maintain a primary task goal (e.g., count passes vs. name ink colors, respectively) while a 
potential source of interference is also presented (e.g., a gorilla vs. a word, respectively).  
Consistent with this idea, individual differences in WMC have been shown to predict an 
auditory form of IB more commonly referred to as the cocktail party effect.  The cocktail 
party effect is the observation that, when in a noisy environment such as a party, people have 
the ability to attend to their own conversation and to ignore potentially distracting 
conversations/stimuli that are occurring around them (with the exception of a salient stimulus 
like one’s own name, which, for some, seems to capture attention fairly automatically).  
Using a variant of a dichotic listening paradigm developed by Cherry (1953) and Moray 
(1959), Conway et al. (2001) asked participants to shadow stimuli in one ear and to ignore 
stimuli in their other ear, where each participant’s name was unexpectedly presented in the 
unattended or to-be-ignored channel.  As expected on the basis of the cocktail party effect 
literature, when questioned after completion of the task, about 40% of the participants did 
report hearing their name during the experiment.  However, Conway et al. also found that 
there were clear individual differences in susceptibility to the classic cocktail party 
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phenomenon. That is, while 65% of the individuals with lower WMC reported hearing their 
name, only 20% of the individuals with higher WMC noticed his/her name.  According to 
Conway et al., individuals with higher WMC are more capable of inhibiting non-goal related 
or distracting stimuli, even if it is as salient and emotionally relevant as one’s own name.   
 
Motivation for the Current Study and Predictions 
Thus, while there is preliminary support for the idea that individual differences in 
attentional capacity will modulate susceptibility to IB, the present study sought to provide a 
strong test of this hypothesis by investigating the relationship between WMC and IB in a 
large sample (N > 300) of young adults.  We believe there are two alternative predictions 
regarding the direction of the relationship between individual differences in WMC and 
susceptibility to IB.  Interestingly, Conway and colleagues (2001) suggested two similar 
predictions for individual differences in susceptibility to the cocktail party effect. Given the 
Conway et al. finding of decreased susceptibility to the cocktail party effect with higher 
WMC, one would predict a positive relationship between WMC and IB.  That is, if failing to 
notice a salient stimulus like one’s own name generalizes to the “gorilla in the room” in a 
typical IB experiment, individuals with greater WMC will be more susceptible to IB.  
According to this prediction, those with greater WMC are better able to inhibit potentially 
distracting stimuli, including the gorilla used in classic IB paradigms (Simons & Chabris, 
1999).  However, this prediction overlooks an important methodological difference between 
the work of Conway et al. and prevailing IB paradigms.  Specifically, in the cocktail party 
effect study, participants were explicitly instructed to both attend to stimuli in one ear and to 
ignore stimuli in their other ear.  In contrast, in a typical IB study, participants are given a 
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single task goal (e.g., count passes among the actors playing a basketball game), and hence, 
any additional goal(s) related to unexpected stimuli are ambiguous.  Therefore, an alternative 
prediction is that individuals with greater WMC will be less susceptible to IB.  According to 
this prediction, those with greater WMC have more attentional resources at their disposal, 
and these resources can be used flexibly (e.g., to actively inhibit potential distractions as in 
the Conway et al. study, or to distribute more broadly across multiple goals).   If this is the 
case, individuals with greater WMC will be better able to maintain a primary goal in an IB 
study (e.g., counting passes), and they will also have enough residual attentional resources to 
spontaneously monitor the environment for any unexpected stimuli (e.g., a gorilla).  
Individuals with lower WMC will have just enough attentional resources to maintain the 
















Participants included 306 undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses at the 
University of Utah. They participated in this study in exchange for research credits.  All 
participants were fluent in English based on self-report and were between the ages of 18 and 
35.  
 
Design and Materials 
Participants were sorted into three groups of subjects with high, medium, or low 
working memory capacity, respectively, based on their performance on an operation span test 
(Engle, 2002; Hutchison, 2007).  Within the context of the Simons and Chabris (1999) 
experiment, the primary dependent measure was susceptibility to inattentional blindness 
(e.g., failing to notice the gorilla in the basketball video that was described briefly in the 
Introduction).  Additional details about tasks and materials are provided below. 
Operation span test.  Each participant completed an automated operation span test 
(OSPAN) to obtain a measure of working memory capacity/controlled attention (Unsworth, 
Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005).  In this task, participants were required to solve math 
problems followed by a to-be-remembered letter – for example, “Is (8/4) + 3 = 4? A.”  After 
varying numbers of these equation-letter pairs, participants were prompted to recall all of the 
letters of each set in order.  Trials were pseudo-randomized such that participants were 
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unable to predict the set size of upcoming equation-letter pairs (set size ranged from 3 to 7 
equation-letter pairs).  Participants were given points equal to the set size when all of the 
letters in that set were recalled correctly in serial order (i.e., an absolute span score).  Total 
operation span was defined as the sum of points across all of the individual recall periods, 
with a maximum possible score of 75 points.  Math accuracy was also tracked, and feedback 
was provided to participants during the task.  This feedback was intended to keep problem 
solving accuracy above 85% and to encourage participants’ compliance with the dual-task 
math/memory instructions of the OSPAN task that should place a burden on their limited 
capacity attentional resources.    
Inattentional blindness task.  Each participant watched the basketball/gorilla video 
originally used by Simons and Chabris (1999) to empirically demonstrate the psychological 
phenomenon of IB.  Specifically, participants viewed video footage, lasting about 24 
seconds, of six individuals playing a game of basketball.  These six individuals were divided 
into two different teams as designated by the color of their shirts (e.g., black or white).  Each 
team passed a basketball among its three players, making two different types of passes, 
bounce and aerial.   About halfway through the video, unbeknownst to subjects, an actor in a 
gorilla suit entered from the right view of the shot, proceeded to walk across the frame, 
paused for a moment in the middle of the frame just in front of the basketball game to beat its 
chest, and then exited from the left view of the shot (appearing for a total of about 8 
seconds).  Prior to watching the video, participants were instructed to keep a separate count 
of both the total number of bounce and the total number of aerial passes made by the black 
team.  To assess susceptibility to IB, at the conclusion of the video, participants were asked 
for the two pass counts, and if they noticed anything unusual in the video (e.g., a gorilla). 
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Rather than assuming that participants are actively engaged in counting passes, it is important 
to consider the actual ability of participants to successfully comply with this primary task 
goal.  Similar to the OSPAN task, compliance with the IB task instructions can be quantified 
using an accuracy percentage.  Participants were considered on-task if their overall accuracy 
was 80% or above.1 
 
Procedure 
Following informed consent, participants were tested individually or in groups that 
ranged from 2 to 5 people while completing the OSPAN test.  After a short break, each 
participant completed the IB task during a one-on-one session with the experimenter.  At the 
conclusion of the experiment, participants received a questionnaire that probed their 




 Accuracy = | (correct bounce pass count – participant’s bounce pass count)| + | (correct 
aerial pass count – participant’s aerial pass count)|.  This two-step formula involving absolute 
values takes into account the fact that participants were asked to maintain two separate pass 
counts – bounce and aerial.   To achieve the 80% accuracy criterion that reflected on-task 
performance, a summed accuracy score of ≤ 4 was required.  However, this score could be 
achieved in a variety of ways [e.g., 4 = |(8-6)| + |(12-14)| or 4 = |(8-4)| + |(12-12)|].  The 
correct pass counts (i.e., 8 bounce and 12 aerial passes, respectively) were determined by 
examining still shots of each frame in the single action sequence of the IB/gorilla video from 
Simons and Chabris (1999). 
2
 Participants were removed from analyses reported in the text due to computer/experimenter 
error (N=10) or for failing to maintain high accuracy (i.e., ≥ 80%) on the math portion of the 
OSPAN task (N=9).  As is typically done with IB paradigms (cf., Simons & Chabris, 1999), 
several participants (N=90) also had to be removed from our analyses due to self-reported 
knowledge of the IB task.  IB, often in conjunction with the gorilla video, is a lecture topic in 
many of the undergraduate psychology courses that contribute volunteers to the human 
subject pool at Utah.  Overall, this non-naïve group showed less susceptibility to IB (20%).  
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After applying these three exclusionary criteria, all of the remaining participants (N=197) 























The overall probability of IB replicated the findings of Simons and Chabris (1999) 
with naïve participants showing 42% inattentional blindness.  To address potential individual 
differences in susceptibility to IB, participants were sorted into three groups according to 
their absolute OSPAN score.3 As shown in Table 1 and consistent with the broader WMC 
literature indicating individual differences in goal maintenance, participants with higher 
OSPAN scores were more likely to be on-task with respect to maintaining accurate pass 
counts, F(2,194)=3.81, MSe=.24, p< 05.  Separate chi-square linear-by-linear association 
tests were then used to detect a potential relationship between OSPAN group and 
susceptibility to IB for both the on-task and off-task participants.  This approach is optimal 
for showing a linear trend, either positive or negative in direction, with an ordinal variable 
such as OSPAN group (see Agresti, 1996).  When participants were on-task with their pass 
counts, there was a significant linear-by-linear association between OSPAN group and the 
probability of IB, χ²(1)=4.88, p<.05.  More specifically, as shown in the top panel of Figure 
1, susceptibility to IB clearly decreased across the low, medium, and high OSPAN groups 
(64%, 48%, and 35%, respectively).  However, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1, 
when participants were off-task with their pass counts, a different pattern of IB emerged 
across the three OSPAN groups.  That is, there was no relationship between OSPAN group 
and the probability of IB, as low (37%), medium (39%), and high (35%) OSPAN groups 
were now statistically equivalent in their susceptibility to IB, χ²(1)=.01, p=.94.  Finally, 
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consistent with the outcome of these two chi-square analyses, regression analyses showed a 
significant correlation between the absolute OSPAN score and susceptibility to IB for 
participants who were on-task with respect to their pass counts (r=.23, p<.05), but no 
correlation for those participants who were off-task (r=-.06, p=.55).  For on-task participants, 






 To better represent the distribution of possible scores, participants were sorted on the basis 
of their absolute OSPAN performance prior to the removal of the non-naïve subjects as 
described in Footnote 2.  In general, the summary statistics on the absolute OSPAN measure 
for our participants (Mean = 40.39, SD = 17.91, skewness = -.24, and kurtosis = -.68) 
compared favorably to those originally reported by Unsworth et al. (2005) with the 
automated OSPAN test.  For the participants (N=197) who were included in the final 
analyses reported in the Results, the mean absolute OSPAN scores for the low (N=63), 
medium (N=60), and high groups (N=74) were 19, 41, and 59, respectively.  Finally, when 
the absolute OSPAN scores were considered separately for both the on-task and off-task 

















Probability and Frequency (N) of On- and Off-Task Pass Counts 
as a Function of Performance on the Operation Span Task 
                           
 Operation Span  Low  Medium High  
On-Task   .35(22) .45(27) .58(43) 

























































Percent Inattentional Blindness as a Function of Performance  
on the Operation Span Task 
As shown in the top panel, for those participants who were on-task with respect to their pass 
counts, susceptibility to inattentional blindness decreased with increased working memory 
capacity.  However, as shown in the bottom panel, for those participants who were off-task 
with respect to their pass counts, there was no relationship between susceptibility to 






























There are two important points to note about the results of the present study.  First, 
our results replicated the original Simons and Chabris (1999) experiment with regard to the 
overall probability of IB.  Second, and more importantly, we demonstrated that individual 
differences in WMC/OSPAN performance modulated susceptibility to IB.  Specifically, 
when participants were on-task with regard to their pass counts, those with lower WMC were 
more likely to exhibit IB than those with higher WMC.  In this way, our IB results are 
consistent with a growing body of literature on WMC indicating that performance on many 
“gold standard” cognitive psychology paradigms – including Stroop color naming, the 
cocktail party phenomenon, or associative memory illusions – is dependent on individual 
differences in attentional control (Engle, 2002; Watson et al., 2005).  
 
Theoretical Implications of Individual Differences in  
Susceptibility to Inattentional Blindness    
First, consider the potential implication of our IB results for theories of controlled 
attention and individual differences in frontally-mediated WMC (cf., Kane & Engle, 2002; 
Watson et al., in press).  To place our IB results in an appropriate context, it is noteworthy 
that the WMC literature contains several examples of studies where individuals with greater 
WMC are better able than those with lower WMC at simultaneously maintaining two 
explicitly stated task goals.  For instance, individuals with greater WMC are better at 
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simultaneously memorizing letters or words while solving math problems as in an OSPAN 
task (or comparable complex span tasks; see Conway et al., 2005).  As noted earlier, 
individuals with greater WMC, as measured by varying levels of OSPAN performance, are 
also better at attending to ink colors while actively inhibiting words as in the classic Stroop 
task (Kane & Engle, 2003).  Taken together, these findings support the notion that the 
increased attentional resources afforded by greater WMC can be used in a highly flexible 
manner (e.g., to distribute more broadly across multiple task goals as in math/memory with 
OSPAN, or to attend to relevant aspects of a stimulus while ignoring potentially distracting 
dimensions as in ink colors and words, respectively, with Stroop).  Returning to the present 
study, our IB results extend this notion of more flexible thought with greater attentional 
resources in an important way.  Specifically, recall that in our IB study participants were only 
instructed to count passes; hence, any additional task goals were ambiguous.  In other words, 
in contrast to the OSPAN and Stroop tasks, participants were not explicitly told to either 
attend to or to ignore possible distractions.  Yet, as shown in the top panel of Figure 1, 
individuals with greater WMC were more likely to spontaneously allocate their additional 
attentional resources to detect any unusual stimuli that appeared, including the gorilla, 
thereby decreasing susceptibility to IB.  Though flexible processing has long been considered 
a hallmark of higher-order cognition (Fuster, 1985), within the executive attention literature 
(see Engle, 2002; Kane & Engle, 2002; 2003), it is atypical to report individuals with greater 
WMC exerting more attentional control than those with lower WMC in the absence of 
explicit, experimenter-provided task goals (see Watson et al., 2005, for additional 
discussion).  But our WMC/IB results are more generally consistent with the finding of 
increased cognitive flexibility and response to novel, unexpected stimuli with greater 
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frontally-mediated executive attention resources (Fougnie & Marois, 2007; Kiehl et al., 2001; 
Knight, 1991). 
With respect to implications for designing studies that investigate individual 
differences in susceptibility to IB, our results suggest that there are two important 
methodological points to consider.  First, one’s ability to observe possible individual 
differences in susceptibility to IB is predicated upon establishing that participants are 
compliant with primary task goals.  Put differently, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1, 
we did not observe a relationship between individual differences in WMC and susceptibility 
to IB when participants were off-task with respect to the goal of counting passes.  Second, 
though being on-task with a primary goal is necessary for observing individual differences in 
susceptibility to IB, in and of itself, it is clearly not sufficient.  One must also characterize 
individual differences in terms of limited capacity attentional resources (Engle, 2002), or 
more specifically, variability in participants’ ability to successfully maintain task goals (e.g., 
counting passes) in the face of potentially interfering information (e.g., a gorilla).  Consistent 
with this argument, in a recently published IB study, Simons and Jensen (2009) used a 
multiple object tracking task and investigated the relationship between individual differences 
in tracking speed and susceptibility to IB.  Prior to assessing IB, variability in tracking speed 
was determined adaptively for each participant to achieve a uniform 75% accuracy threshold, 
thereby assuring that all participants were on-task.  Interestingly, individual differences in 
this processing speed measure did not modulate susceptibility to IB.  In contrast, Hannon and 
Richards (2010) used a very similar multiple object tracking task to Simons and Jensen 
(2009) and reported that individual differences in WMC, as indexed by OSPAN 
performance, did modulate susceptibility to IB.  More specifically, Hannon and Richards 
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found that individuals who noticed the unexpected stimuli in their object tracking task had 
slightly higher OSPAN scores than those who failed to notice the unexpected stimuli (also 
see Richards, Hannon, & Derakshan, in press).  In other words, presence/absence of IB was 
the independent variable for sorting participants, and OSPAN scores were the dependent 
variable (i.e., the opposite of the approach illustrated in Figure 1).  They also obtained a 
significant correlation between susceptibility to IB and OSPAN performance, where 
individuals with greater WMC were less susceptible to IB (virtually identical to the 
correlation reported in our Results). 
Why do individual differences in WMC predict susceptibility to IB, whereas 
variability in object tracking speed does not?   One possible explanation for the discrepancy 
between the results of Hannon and Richards (2010) and those of Simons and Jensen (2009) 
stems from the observation that measures of WMC and processing speed, though somewhat 
correlated, appear to capture relatively distinct aspects of cognition (cf., McCabe et al., 
2010).  For our purposes, the central point is that WMC measures like OSPAN are an 
especially sensitive measure of individual differences in controlled cognition or management 
of distraction, and are driven, at least in part, by limited capacity executive attention 
resources in prefrontal cortex (Kane & Engle, 2002; Watson et al., in press).  Hence, to the 
extent one is on-task with a primary goal in an IB study, individual differences in WMC may 
be an ideal proxy for quantifying the residual executive attention resources that are available 
for noticing unexpected stimuli and, by extension, for predicting one’s level of susceptibility 
to IB.  In this light, the results of our study resolve an emerging discrepancy in the attention 
literature and suggest that there indeed are individual differences in cognitive abilities that 
underlie differential susceptibility to IB.  Furthermore, as is traditionally done within the 
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WMC literature, our participants were sorted into varying levels of attentional control to 
address a particular research question.  That is, in contrast to Hannon and Richards, OSPAN 
performance was the independent variable, and susceptibility to IB was the dependent 
variable.  As nicely illustrated in Figure 1, the primary advantage of this approach is that it 
facilitates estimates of the relative susceptibility to IB across different levels of WMC, 
allowing one to cautiously ascribe a causal role to individual differences in attentional 
control (akin to Conway et al., 2001, who quantified differential susceptibility to the classic 
cocktail party phenomenon for those with high and low WMC; see Engle, 2002, for 
additional discussion).  Moreover, our study demonstrated decreased susceptibility to IB with 
increasing WMC in a classic IB paradigm, where IB was assessed using the gorilla video 
from the original Simons and Chabris (1999) study rather than more recently implemented 
multiple object tracking tasks (cf., Hannon & Richards; Simons & Jensen). 
 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
In conclusion, the results of the present study demonstrated that individual differences 
in WMC modulated susceptibility to IB, resolving a discrepancy between the results of 
Simons and Jensen (2009) and those more recently reported by Hannon and Richards (2010).  
Specifically, when participants were on-task with regard to their pass counts, those with 
lower WMC were more likely to exhibit IB than those with higher WMC.  In this way, our 
results are more broadly consistent with other recent studies suggesting that diminished 
attentional control increases the likelihood of missing unexpected events (see Rizzo et al., 
2009, for evidence of increased change blindness in older adults and in patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease).  Future studies addressing potential individual differences in 
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susceptibility to IB may find it useful to directly compare the predictive ability of WMC with 
other cognitive measures (e.g., processing speed, personality profiles) within the same 
participants.  Alternatively, were one to disambiguate task goals with respect to unexpected 
stimuli (e.g., the gorilla), the direction of the relationship between individual differences in 
WMC and susceptibility to IB might reverse.  That is, in contrast to our findings shown in the 
top panel of Figure 1, were participants explicitly instructed to inhibit the critical IB stimulus, 
individuals with greater WMC might now be more susceptible to IB.  Such a finding would 
be more consistent with the results of the Conway et al. (2001) cocktail party study, and our 
alternative hypothesis, where as many as 80% of  individuals with high WMC failed to notice 
their own name in the unattended channel.  At present, our results clearly suggest that 
considering WMC, or variability in attentional control, is an effective mechanism to explain 
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